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Abstract. The differences in the ownership structures of downtown retail districts and
shopping centers may give rise to varying space allocations and rental contracts found
in these markets. This article speciﬁcally examines the value-enhancing aspects of
percentage leases and explores the mechanisms of tenant mix, risk sharing and rent
discrimination through which this value is created. The use of percentage leases may lead
to superior returns by allowing a rent structure that approaches perfect price
discrimination. Risk sharing through the use of percentage leases may also create value
for the property owner and lead to lower rents for tenants.
Introduction
In what important dimensions are shopping centers superior to downtown retail
districts? It is fairly obvious that they are located differently and the shopping center
location may be superior in providing access for shoppers using contemporary modes
of transport. Access may relate to attributes such as proximity to circumferential
highways or the adequacy or price of parking. What probably is less obvious, but
arguably no less important, is that downtown retail shops have many owners (i.e., are
owned atomistically), whereas shopping centers are collections of stores owned by a
single entity. This ownership difference gives rise to differences in space allocation
and rental contracts. Shopping centers, especially regional malls, provide a context in
which it is possible to use percentage lease contracts in which rent is a percentage of
the tenant’s gross income. This article shows that percentage leases, in the jargon of
real estate practice, create value. Three mechanisms by which percentage leases create
value are diversiﬁcation, risk sharing and rent discrimination.
The methodology in this article is theoretical, based on a series of graphical
presentations. The techniques are well established, for example using measures of
expected utility and the analysis of the beneﬁts of trade through Edgeworth boxes.
These techniques have not before been applied in a systematic explanation of the
value-enhancing aspects of percentage leases: tenant mix, risk sharing and rent
discrimination. Recent work by Lee (1988), Vandell and Carter (1993) and Eppli and
Benjamin (1994) provide extensive overviews of the general literature concerning
retail research.1
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The theory presented provides insight into the practical use of percentage leases and
their possible role in urban spatial organization. The inclusion of percentage rents
within a property’s rent structure can lead to superior returns over a uniform rent
structure and can also lead to possible beneﬁts to the tenant via lower rents. Even
though the use of percentage leases may create value, the ownership structure of
downtown retail districts is not conducive to the use of percentage leases. Thus, the
beneﬁt associated with percentage leases varies spatially, affecting the spatial
organization of shopping.
This article is divided into ﬁve parts, the ﬁrst three are devoted to diversiﬁcation, risk
sharing and rent discrimination, respectively. In the ﬁnal two sections, we offer
practical applications and our conclusions.
Diversiﬁcation
A landlord acting in much the same way as an insurance company may add value to
a portfolio of leases by bringing together tenants with different income prospects, if
the incomes of the tenants are not perfectly positively correlated. The tenants are
attracted by the risk reduction associated with percentage leases when compared to
ﬂat rent contracts.
Consider the case of a landlord with a portfolio of two leases. Further, consider an
extreme case in which the tenants have one of two gross incomes, low income or
high income. Still further, assume that the incomes of these tenants are perfectly
negatively correlated, when one experiences the low income the other experiences the
high income.
Under these conditions, the principles relating to diversiﬁcation can be shown by the
use of an Edgeworth box diagram (see Exhibit 1). The sides of the Edgeworth box
represent a tenant’s income prospects net of all costs except rent. The longer horizontal
sides represent high income net of non-rent costs and the shorter vertical sides
represent low income net of non-rent costs. It is assumed that non-rent costs are
proportional to income, so the slope of the diagonal line connecting the opposite
corners of the box is the ratio of the two gross incomes. The tenant’s rents are
measured from the upper right-hand corner, with the remaining portion of income net
of non-rent cost referred to as net income. Net income is deﬁned here as gross income
minus the non-rent costs of operation (income net of non-rent cost) minus rent. Note
that the tenant’s net income could be measured from the lower left-hand corner. Flat
rent contracts, equal rent in either state of income, are found along a 458 line from
the upper right-hand corner of the box. This line will be referred to as the tenants’
ﬂat rent line. All contracts falling along a line perpendicular to the tenants ﬂat rent
line (458 line) produce equal receipts for the landlord (recall the covariance of the
two tenants’ incomes). Thus, these lines will be denoted as equal-expected-rent (EER)
lines. For example in Exhibit 1, contract a represents a particular ﬂat rent contract
and all contracts that produce receipts for the landlord equal to those of contact a are
found along EER1. Under a percentage rent contract, rents are proportional to income
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Exhibit 1
Value Created through Tenant Diversiﬁcation
percentage rent contracts fall upon the diagonal connecting the upper right-hand
corner with the opposite corner of the box. Contract b is the percentage rent contract
that produces rent equivalent to the ﬂat rent contract a. Contract c is a contract in
which the percentage of rent for the high income exceeds the percentage for the low
income.
In contrast to the landlord, each tenant faces uncertain prospects, so it is not sufﬁcient
to focus on the tenant’s expected net income as an indicator of welfare. Rather, it is
necessary to understand that tenants’ expected utility is affected by lease contracts. In
an Edgeworth box diagram, this is done by utilizing indifference curves that we will
refer to as equal-expected-utility (EEU) curves. The slope of an EEU curve, often
called the marginal rate of substitution, is the negative of the ratio of the marginal
utility at high net income to the marginal utility at low net income (i.e., probabilities
are not involved because the probabilities of the two incomes are equal). If a tenant
faces zero risk, net income in the high and low state are equal, and the marginal
utilities must also be equal. Therefore, along a 458 line out of the lower left-hand
corner, the slope of the EEU curve or marginal rate of substitution is 21, the same
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convex, because the tenants are risk averse. As high net income increases and low
net income decreases along an EEU curve, the marginal utility increases if income is
low and the marginal utility decreases if income is high. Therefore, the ratio of
marginal low net income to marginal high net income increases and the slope of the
EEU curve becomes steeper.
To focus on the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation as distinct from the beneﬁts of risk sharing,
the advantage to the tenant of a percentage rent contract verses a ﬂat rent contract
will be examined holding the landlord’s aggregate revenue constant (i.e., the landlord
will assume no additional risk by using percentage rents in place of ﬂat rents). Thus,
risk is not introduced into the landlord’s portfolio. If the landlord’s position is to
remain unchanged, then the resulting improvement in net income for the tenant with
low income must equal the resulting decline in net income when income is high.
The advantage to the tenant of a percentage rent contract in contrast to a ﬂat rent
contract can be found by comparing the ﬂat rent contract a to the percentage contract
b. Both contracts fall on the same EER line, thus providing the landlord with
equivalent aggregate rent. The EEU curve that passes through contract a, EEU1, falls
below contract b (i.e., a EEU curve higher than EEU1 goes through point b), thus the
tenant prefers the percentage contract b to the ﬂat rent contract a. This unequivocally
demonstrates that the tenants are better off under the percentage lease than they were
under the ﬂat lease, holding the landlord at the same level of revenue. It cannot be
argued that the percentage rent contract maximizes tenant welfare while holding
aggregate rent constant, only that it offers an improvement over a ﬂat rent contract.
Actually, contract c maximizes tenant welfare in this context. The EEU curve
associated with contract c would have a slope of 21 at point c, therefore the EEU
curve would be tangent with EER1 at point c.
Another way to look at the problem is to hold the tenants’ welfare constant and
identify the premium they would be willing to pay in return for the reduced risk they
face as a result of the percentage lease. The landlord’s rent receipts will increase by
the amount that the tenants’ expected income declines. In Exhibit 1, the percentage
contract d, provides the tenant with an equivalent level of utility to that of the ﬂat
rent contract a. The premium paid to the landlord is the difference between the
increase in rent under high income and the rent decline under low income. The
premium associated with contract d when compared to contract a can be represented
as the difference in the levels of rent associated with each contract’s EER line, as
shown in Exhibit 1. The percentage rent does not represent the optimal contract in
the sense of maximizing aggregate rent while holding tenant utility constant. The
optimal contract would be at point e, where the EER curve is tangent to the EEU1
curve. Although the percentage rent contract is not optimal in the sense of maximizing
aggregate rent while holding tenant utility constant, it does provide a premium over
a ﬂat rent contract.
While percentage rent contracts have been shown to be superior to ﬂat rent contracts,
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This appearance results from artiﬁcially constraining of the landlord to a riskless
position. On the other hand, this constraint is useful in distinguishing the beneﬁts of
diversiﬁcation from the beneﬁts of risk sharing.
Risk Sharing2
To focus on the value creation associated with risk sharing alone, the gains associated
with diversiﬁcation from altering the rent contingencies in the lease must be removed.
This can be accomplished by assuming a landlord with a single tenant (i.e., atomistic
ownership). As before, assume that the tenant has uncertain income in that income
could be either high or low. The different levels of income are assumed to occur with
equal probability.
The question is whether moving away from a contract with ﬂat rent could beneﬁt one
party (i.e., the tenant or the landlord) without injuring the other. If so, it should be a
simple matter to redistribute the gains so both would be made better off by the change.
Of course, a ﬂat rent contract produces a certain outcome for the landlord while
requiring the tenant to bear all of the risk. We would ﬁrst like to show that holding
the tenant’s expected utility constant, but decreasing his risk, will cause the landlord
to share risk and may cause the landlord’s expected utility to increase.
The proposition that risk sharing necessarily creates value actually can be proven
using an Edgeworth box diagram (see Exhibit 2). When the landlord faces uncertain
prospects, we must use indifference curves to judge landlord welfare. The landlord’s
equal-expected-utility (eeu) curves have the same direction of curvature relative to the
upper right-hand corner of the box as the tenant’s EEU curves do relative to the lower
left-hand corner. Both the tenant and landlord are risk averse. The landlord’s eeu
curves have a slope of 21 at their intersection with the tenant’s ﬂat rent line. At points
along the tenant’s ﬂat rent line there is certainty for the landlord (i.e., regardless of
the state of income, rents are equal), thus the numerator and denominator of the
marginal rate of substitution are equal.
Beginning with ﬂat rent contract a, and holding the tenant’s expected utility constant
leads us to percentage rent contract d. The landlord is better off with contract d than
with contract a; contract d is associated with a higher level of expected utility than
contract a. This demonstrates conclusively that risk sharing via percentage rents is
superior to a ﬂat rent contract. Note however that the landlord’s utility would be
maximized at an even more extreme contract f, the tangency point of eeu2 and EEU1.
The landlord receives an increase in expected rent to overcome the increase in risk
of moving from a certain ﬂat rent to a contract in which rent is related to the tenant’s
income. In Exhibit 2, the increase in expected rent could be illustrated as the difference
between the EER line which is tangent to eeu1 at point a and the higher EER through
point g. The tenant, in order to maintain a constant level of satisfaction, must enjoy
an offsetting decline in the variation of net income. The decline in variation of net
income can be seen as the relatively large change in rents for high income when244 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Exhibit 2
Value Created through Risk Sharing
compared to the change in rents for low income when moving from a ﬂat rent contract
a to the percentage contract g. The decline in the difference between the high and
low outcomes is exactly equal to the new variation in rent received by the landlord.
Another way of looking at the problem would be to hold landlord expected utility
constant. Again, starting with contract a, the percentage rent contract g makes the
tenant better off but not as well off as contract h, found at the tangency point of eeu1
and EEU2. Once again, we see that risk sharing by the use of percentage rents is
superior to a ﬂat rent contract.
The ﬁnal percentage rent contract would be negotiated somewhere between contracts
d and g depending on the bargaining power of the two parties. While the percentage
lease may not be optimal, it approximates an optimal contract under the various
conditions speciﬁed. Risk sharing always creates value if the parties to the contract
are risk averse.
Rent Discrimination
Does a competent manager of a mall rent a vacant store to the highest bidder? This
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Exhibit 3
Price Discrimination and Willingness to Pay with External Effects
type A square feet type B square feet
externality effects on A
$/sf
type A willingness to pay with externality effects
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but this is not optimal behavior for the manager of a mall. Rent discrimination,
charging different rents to different retailers, is optimal. This optimal rent strategy has
important implications. First, it alters the mix of stores. Second, it creates value. As
before, it is not our task to indicate how this value is distributed among tenants,
landlords and shoppers, only that it exists.
The two types of rent discrimination considered are simple discrimination and perfect
discrimination. Simple rent discrimination is a situation where each retailer within a
retail classiﬁcation (e.g., shoe stores) is charged a particular rent that is different than
that charged other classiﬁcations (e.g., jewelry stores). In contrast, perfect rent
discrimination is a situation in which each retailer is charged a different rent so as to
extract all surplus. Benjamin, Boyle and Sirmans (1992) ﬁnd empirical evidence
indicating the use of price discrimination in shopping center leases.
Suppose the landlord owns a shopping mall of size T that contains two types of stores,
type A and type B. The presence of type B stores conveys external beneﬁts on type
A stores. The magnitude of these external beneﬁts per square foot is illustrated in
Exhibit 3 by the line labeled ‘‘externality effects on A’’ and are denoted XA. Note, the
magnitude of the external beneﬁt is a function of the number of square feet that type
B stores occupy. The line representing this external beneﬁt emerges from the origin
on the right, a point where no type B tenants exist, to a maximum external beneﬁt
when type B tenants occupy the maximum possible amount of space.246 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Exhibit 4
Price Discrimination—Lease Revenue with External Effects
type A square feet type B square feet
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The willingness of type A tenants to pay rent in the absence of type B tenants and
any externalities, Da, is shown in Exhibit 3 by the line labeled ‘‘type A willingness
to pay rent without externality effects.’’ This would be like allowing only shoe stores
in the mall.
The vertical summation of the external effect on A(XA) and type A’s willingness to
pay rent without externality effects (Da) identiﬁes the willingness of type A tenants
to pay rent per square foot allocated to type A(DA). The line DA is actually a locus of
points along demand curves given varying allocations of type B. For example in
Exhibit 3, the willingness of type A tenants to pay rent with externality given an
allocation T 2 x of type B, is equal to the vertical sum of the willingness of type A
tenants to pay rent in the absence of externality effects, (Da) and the magnitude of
the externality effect on A(XA(T 2 x)) denoted as Da 1 XA(T 2 x) in Exhibit 3. Point
b represents the willingness to pay in the presence of externalities given an allocation
of type B equivalent to T 2 x. As the allocation to type B changes, the level of the
externality effect XA(T 2 x) changes mapping out the points of the locus.
At allocation x in Exhibit 4, type A tenants would be willing to pay Rx per square
foot if they all paid the same rent. The total revenue from type A would equal the
area of the lightly shaded rectangle (i.e., rent Rx multiplied by quantity x). Marginal
revenue, the change in revenue due to a unit change in square feet, is shown as a line
that is twice as steep as the willingness to pay with externality effects. Again, this
assumes that all type A tenants pay the same rent per square foot. The area Rxx isPERCENTAGE LEASES AND THE ADVANTAGES OF REGIONAL MALLS 247
equal to the area under the marginal revenue curve up to allocation x (i.e., the area
of DadRx equals the area of Dbdf).
If the landlord requires a contract contingency where each type A tenant is charged
a different rent per square foot, thereby extracting all surplus, then the marginal
revenue from imposing perfect price discrimination would be higher at each allocation.
The surplus at allocation x is shown by the darkly shaded triangle (DbRxc); the total
revenue is the area of the shaded trapezoid. The area of the trapezoid is equal to the
area under the curve labeled marginal revenue with perfect discrimination.
A landlord may use percentage rent contracts to create a contingent contract that calls
for a different rent from every tenant. For example, a landlord that charges type A
tenants a base rent of Rx per square foot with a contingency that if income rises above
Rx/r, the tenants must pay 100r% of their income as rent; a contingent contract that
potentially calls for a different rent from every tenant. If a tenant’s willingness to pay
is based roughly on income, then percentage leases approximate perfect rent
discrimination.
Suppose that type B tenants are anchor tenants and get little or no positive externalities
from type A tenants. The willingness to pay without externalities is then the same as
that with externalities and the same as the marginal revenue with perfect price
discrimination. Furthermore, anchor tenants are likely to have much ﬂatter demand
curves because their opportunities include many close substitutes (e.g., freestanding
stores outside of the mall’s ring road). Exhibit 5 illustrates an extreme case in which
type B tenants have a perfectly elastic demand curve. In this case, type B tenants have
marginal curves that are identical to their average curve, the ﬂat demand curve.
If retail space is leased to the highest bidder (i.e., if the landlord were playing a
competitive/downtown game), then the landlord’s portfolio of leases would move
toward the situation illustrated in Exhibit 5 with all rents equal at the amount that the
marginal tenants are willing to pay; R1A and R1B for type A and B tenants, respectively.
Under this scenario, a majority of space, x1, would be allocated to type A tenants and
T 2 x1 to type B tenants. The landlord’s revenue would equal the area of the rectangle
with the darkest shading (rectangle 0R1AR1BT).
Suppose, on the other hand, that space is leased so as to maximize revenue and that
it is possible to rent discriminate across tenant types. That is, it is not possible for a
tenant to rent space as a shoe store and then switch merchandise to become a jewelry
store. In this case of simple rent discrimination, the allocation of space would be at
x2 with a majority of the space now being allocated to type B tenants, with much less
allocated to type A tenants. Rent per square foot for type A tenants would be R2A and
R1B for type B tenants. Under simple rent discrimination, the landlord’s revenue is
greater than if leased to the highest bidder by the area the triangle with the lightest
shading (DbjR1A).
Finally, imagine that the landlord possesses contract attributes, perhaps percentage
leases, that allow him to engage in perfect rent discrimination. Not only can different248 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Exhibit 5
Price Discrimination—Lease Revenue without External Effects
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base rents be set for different types of tenants, but also higher than minimum gross
income yields proportionately higher rent. In the case of perfect rent discrimination
illustrated in Exhibit 5, the allocation is at x3, which falls between the two extremes
already shown. It is not a general rule that the allocation with perfect rent
discrimination falls between the competitive and the simple price discrimination
allocations. Rather, it comes directly from the assumption that type B tenants have a
ﬂat demand curve. The rent charged type A tenants is R3A, whereas the rent charged
type B tenants is still R1B. What really should interest us is the implication for revenue.
The revenue generated under perfect rent discrimination is equal to the entire shaded
area in Exhibit 5 and provides the landlord with the highest level of revenue of the
cases considered. The revenue under perfect rent discrimination is greater than the
revenue under simple price discrimination by the area of the triangle with the
intermediate shading (Dahj).
There are other implications of perfect rent discrimination. Suppose that under simple
rent discrimination the landlord maximizes revenue by holding some stores vacant. It
can be that the same situation would call for zero vacancies if perfect rent
discrimination were possible. Suppose that a mall has two types of tenants, A and C.
Type A tenants receive external beneﬁts from type C tenants but not vice versa. Both
types of tenants have downward sloping demand curves. The marginal revenue curvePERCENTAGE LEASES AND THE ADVANTAGES OF REGIONAL MALLS 249
Exhibit 6
Price Discrimination—Lease Revenue and Occupancy Levels













for type C tenants under perfect rent discrimination is the same as their demand curve
(see Exhibit 6).
Let us assume that the marginal cost of occupancy is zero. This means that the
landlord’s expenses are the same regardless of the level of occupancy or vacancy, n.
It is not a problem to assume otherwise, the marginal cost of occupancy could be
negative or positive where negative (positive) means that vacant space costs the
landlord more (less) than occupied space. Under the assumption of marginal cost of
occupancy being zero, a simple rent discriminating landlord will not allocate space
so as to equate the marginal revenues if the marginal revenues are equated at a
negative value. That is, it pays the landlord to back off on occupancy to the point
where the marginal revenue from each tenant type is zero.
In Exhibit 6, the vacancy desired by a simple rent discriminating landlord is shown
as v. This is the gap between the horizontal intercepts of the marginal revenue curves.
Thus, setting marginal revenue equal to zero for each type of tenant does not fully
utilize the rentable space. The rents charged type A and type C tenants by the simple
rent discriminating landlord are R1A and R1C, respectively. In contrast, the perfect rent250 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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discriminator would choose the allocation x2 with no vacancy. This allocation is that
which equates the perfect price discriminating marginal revenue for each type of
tenant. Recall that for tenant type C, the demand curve and the perfect rent
discriminating marginal revenue curve are one and the same. The base rents charged
type A and type C tenants are R2A and R2C, respectively. The relative rents reverse
when simple and perfect rent discrimination are compared. Type A tenants are charged
more base rent than type C with perfect rent discrimination, but type A tenants are
charged less rent than type C with simple rent discrimination.
As a side issue, note that the relative allocations are very different in Exhibits 5 and
6. In Exhibit 5, the perfect rent discrimination produces an allocation between those
of simple rent discrimination and competition. In Exhibit 6, the competitive allocation
(i.e., where the demand curves cross) is between the extremes of simple and perfect
rent discrimination.
Implications
The practical applications of the theory in this article are to alert property managers,
urban economists and urban planners to the source of a new view of urban spatial
organization. First, property managers should take from this article a new appreciation
of the importance of charging different rents to different tenants. They can achieve
superior returns by traditional price discrimination (i.e., charging higher rents to less
rent sensitive tenants), but may push the envelope further by recognizing that
percentage rents may move the rent structure toward perfect price discrimination.
Property managers and tenants should begin to recognize the gains both sides of the
lease contract may get from the risk sharing aspects of percentage leases. Tenants
may share in any beneﬁts that appear to accrue to landlords via lower rents. Tenants
should be drawn to the insurance features of percentage leases. Of course, shoppers
may be advantaged by lower prices emerging from the beneﬁts of tenants. Finally,
this article alerts urban economists and urban planners to an alternative view of the
decline of downtown shopping associated with the rise of suburban malls. To some
extent, this change in the spatial organization of shopping may be due to the fact that
the downtown ownership structure does not facilitate the use of percentage leases and
the beneﬁts that accrue from these leases. In the most down-to-earth terms possible,
property managers in some areas of real estate should not develop uniform rent
policies, neither should they necessarily rent to the highest bidder. Planners, on the
other hand, should not think that physical changes to the downtown, such as creating
‘‘malls’’ by closing streets, will be sufﬁcient to return downtowns to their previous
dominance in shopping. Rather, the property-rights/ownership-structure may be an
impediment to the return of downtown shopping as a result of limiting the nature of
leases.
Conclusion
Three mechanisms are important in explaining the usefulness of percentage leases.
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percentage leases, provide a landlord with a portfolio of leases an opportunity for
gains over ﬂat rent contracts. Whether this opportunity exists or not depends on the
diversity of the tenants’income prospects. In general, it pays to share risk if the parties
to a contract are each risk averse. This is as true in the context of retail leases as any
other. Rent discrimination inﬂuences the allocation of space and the aggregate rent
that can be generated. Atomistic downtown storeowners do not have the ability to
beneﬁt from diversiﬁcation and rent discrimination, but mall owners do. Either
atomistic or mall landlords may beneﬁt from risk sharing, but the conﬁdence a
landlord has in tenants’ gross income ﬁgures and thus the opportunity to risk share,
may be closely associated with national tenants and regional malls.
While this article outlines three of the mechanisms that make percentage leases create
value, it does not exhaust all of the possibilities. For example, as noted in Miceli and
Sirmans (1992), percentage leases may resolve what would otherwise be an agency
problem. If, for example, the levels of mall advertising, maintenance and security are
inﬂuenced by manager effort and if these levels affect the incomes of the tenants, it
may be desirable to involve the landlord in the businesses of the tenants via percentage
leases. The presence of this incentive will induce the landlord to provide an
appropriate level of effort. Note that under ﬂat rent contracts, if the landlord’s effort
has no inﬂuence on the level rent collected, then he maximizes proﬁts by setting the
level of effort to zero (see Miceli and Sirmans, 1992). Of course, the use of net leases
(i.e., charging tenants for operating expenses) substantially diminishes the impact of
this agency problem since the landlord can pass the costs on to the tenant. A
percentage lease with a base can also be thought of as a call option.
While this article is concerned with the advantages of percentage leases, there are
contexts in which percentage leases are inappropriate. A landlord must have
conﬁdence in the gross income ﬁgures provided by the tenant before the use of a
percentage lease can be justiﬁed. Landlords may take some comfort in the fact that
the tenant must report the same ﬁgures to the sales and income tax authorities so the
landlord can free-ride on their monitoring programs. However, such comfort may be
placing too much weight on a very thin reed (i.e., governmental monitoring). There
may be some incentives not to cheat beyond the sanctions imposed by the tax
authorities and landlord. These incentives may include the desire to establish an
accurate sales record that can be revealed for an anticipated sale of the business, as
well as ethical and religious proscriptions against lying. Nevertheless, a retail
establishment may have some tendency to skim (i.e., close the cash register at some
point during the day), thereby cheating both the tax authorities and the landlord who
uses percentage lease contracts. If the landlord believes that some tenant attribute is
associated with skimming but that the amounts skimmed are somewhat proportional
to actual gross income, the landlord would tend to raise the percentage for tenants
with that attribute. This is a ‘‘lemons problem’’ and would force all such tenants to
skim. The opposite effect might be found for traditional money laundering stores (e.g.,
arcade games). These stores would tend to report more income than they produce
possibly causing landlords to charge them lower percentages. There is an important
exception to this propensity to lie. National tenants tend to provide honest ﬁgures252 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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because they must report to the home ofﬁce, as well as to the tax authorities and the
landlord. Thus regional malls, that exclusively, or nearly exclusively, lease to national
tenants, are the prime candidates for the use of percentage leases.
Notes
1For readers interested in studies exploring the determinants of shopping center rents, see
Benjamin, Boyle and Sirmans (1990), Gatzlaff, Sirmans and Guidry (1993) and Sirmans and
Diskin (1994).
2Inspired by Brueckner (1993) and by conversations with Jan K. Brueckner.
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